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i The study of the way in which man makes a living — a 
short definition of economics — or of how he makes use of lim­
ited resources to satisfy unlimited wants -- another definition 
— has been traced in this work from Aristotle throug^h the Mid­
dle Ages and mercantilism to the nineteenth century, when the 
classicists and their numerous critics, under the influence of 
industrialization and the intellectual trends of the day, cre­
ated a large body of economic thought. In Chapter XIV we saw 
how, at the end of the century, Alfred Marshall (1842-1924) at­
tempted to reformulate"classical theory to bring it up to date. 
He was aware of the criticism that what the classicists had pro­
duced was a science of wealth which was not at all a science of 
welfare. This, many of them had insisted, was their true pur­
pose, to limit themselves to treating what ^  to the exclusion 
of what ought to be. 
Marshall, on the other hand, believed that a study of eco­
nomics should be the most fruitful way ultimately to improve 
the lot of man, but he agreed with the classicists that wealth 
was the most reliable measure of human welfare for the econ­
omist. Therefore, he was primarily concerned with the same 
questions of value arid'price to which'Ricardo and others had 
tried earlier to find the answers. He reaffirmed their assump­
tions about competition and the possibility of reaching a de­
sirable long-run equilibrium in which the forces of supply and 
demand would counterb£(,lance each other. He accepted the hedon­
istic belief that men act to promote pleasure and avoid pain, 
and thought that pleasure and pain were capable of measurement. 
And, since he had confined his subject largely within the class­
ical limits, he felt little need to compare notes with either 
the burgeoning sociologist or psychologist. 
Marshall's distinct contribution to economic theory was to 
provide a more refineS analysis of how prices are determined 
under conditions of pure competition. He explained the many 
factors on which he believed both supply and demand are based in 
the short run, by defi&ition a period too brief for any new 
production, and in the long run, a period long enough for 
changes ins supply and demand to be made, and for an equilibrium 
to be reached. He invented the concept of a representative 
firm, which he defined ;as "one which has had a fairly long 
life, and fair success^ [and] which is managed with normal abil­
ity." The costs of production of this firm, he argued, can be 
used in determining the supply that will be forthcoming in the 
long run from the industry of which it is a part. On the demand 
side, he explained how the diminishing usefulness of a thing as 
a person acquires more of it will influence the amount that will 
be purchased, and he introduced the idea of elasticity of demand 
to explain how the demand for some articles is more responsive 
to price changes than for others. Marshall cautioned that this 
analysis applied to a static world which never existed, but 
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argued that it was still the best approach there was to under­
standing the dynamic and real economic world, an approach com­
parable in value to the physicists' study of frictionless models 
Marshall's creation of neoclassical theory, together with 
similar efforts by contemporaries on both sides of the Atlantic, 
marks the beginning of modern economics„ From its four great 
subdivisions — production, exchange, distribution, and con­
sumption — there developed such familiar college courses as 
marketing, money and banking, value, and consumer economics. 
Later there appeared a related discipline, known as business 
administration, with its courses in management, advertising, 
and sales, its primary purpose being to teach the principles 
and techniques of operating a business. 
In the twentieth century economics, along with the other 
social sciences, has aroused a greatly increased popular inter­
est. Politics may indeed have established its primacy in the 
affairs of Western man, but there are many reasons why econ­
omics looms larger in the public mind then ever before. The 
business of making a living in an increasingly interrelated in­
dustrial world is highly complex. The Great Depression turned 
millions to the study of economics fbr both explanation and 
remedy. Both world wars, and especially the second, demon­
strated that a state wtiich wishes to survive in modern war must 
understand and control its economy Leaders in the world's 
underdeveloped states iire fully awaire that one of their two or 
three major problems is a backward economy. The totalitarian 
states, and even the'il|mocracies, havfe either approached or 
outdone the mercantilists in peacetime regulation of their eco­
nomic potential. These facts help to explain why today econ­
omists occupy many resIJonsible posts in the United Nations and 
in governments all over the world. Present conditions seem to 
guarantee that economics and politics will long continue to be 
closely joined. It is_ironic that within so short a time after 
Alfred Marshall annbtin^ed his prefii^ence for the term "econom­
ics," this discipline should be transformed to the point where 
it would be more accurate to call it by its older name, "polit­
ical economy," and to define it, with the mercantilists, as 
"the study of measureshelpful to the state," 
Economists in th^'. twentieth century have tried to make 
their subject both iii6?e inclusive fend more exact. An example 
of the first of these two goals is institutional economics. The 
American, Thorstein Vebleh (1857-1929), is regarded as its 
founder. In his most famous book, The Theory of the Leisure 
Class (1899) , Veblen severely criticized what Tie called our 
pecuniary society, and especially thfe wealthy, whom he accused 
of "conspicuous consumption" of goods and services mainly to im­
press others. The wealthy, who are out to make money, control 
the levers of industry, which makes goods. They pull the levers 
to satisfy themselves. As a result, production is directed to 
the production of goods for them, and most people do not gain 
the purchasing power to buy what they need. All of society even 
tually suffers. 
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Inspired by Darwin, Veblen tiught that man was a product of 
his social environment, and does What he does because of the 
customs, habits, and traditions of that environment. Economics, 
he insisted, must not dissipate itself in the meaningless study 
of the price of wheat in the long run, or in many other things 
which the classicists regarded as important. Instead, the econ­
omist must concentrate on man and his institutions as both are 
constantly evdlving before him. Veblen defined an institution 
as a customary way of doing or thinking about things. The con­
cept of long-run equilibiium, either of the classical or Marx­
ist variety, is, he thought, a chimera. Economics, according to 
him, must be studied as inseparable from the other aspects of 
culture and must draw upon history, psychology, sociology, an­
thropology, and other studies. Institutional economics has had 
a wide appeal to those who believe that even neoclassical theory 
is irrelevant to the problems of th^ day-to-day world. It has 
appealed also to those who, while refusing to desert heoclassi-
cism, have felt that Veblen added new insights to economics 
which they could not ifford to neglect. 
An example of the attempt to make economics more exact is 
the greatly increased tise of statistics and other mathematical 
tools. This use stems primarily from the efforts of some nine­
teenth century pioneer^ to make it a true science. As one of 
Ihem put it, economics "is a physico-mathematical science like 
mechanics and hydraulic^," and tho^e who study it should "employ 
the methods and language of mathematics." In 1930 a group of 
economists and mathematicians who were in complete agreement 
with this injunction formed the Econometric Society, which pres­
ently has an internatipnal membership of about 2000 persons, 
many of whom are engaged in the mathematical verification or 
disproof of economic theories. 
The economist can use mathematics in several ways. For 
example, since the datS. of his subject are in large part quan­
titative, he can enlplo^ graphs and symbols, which are quanti­
tative measures, to illustrate economic principles and show the 
relations between them^ This procedure has been carried to a 
theoretical level beyond the reach,of anyone who has not mas­
tered higher mathematics, as a glance at some recent numbers of 
the American Economic Review will indicate. The economist also 
uses mathematics xn the form of statistics, which help him 
measure the performance of the economy, make inductive general­
izations about it, and sometimes make predictions. 
In the United States the Departments of Commerce and Labor 
and the Federal Reserve Board regularly publish many series of 
statistics relating to production, employment, money and prices, 
trade, income, and the like. Among the most widely used of 
these statistics are the Consumers' Price Index of the Depart­
ment of Labor and the Index of Industrial Production prepared by 
the Federal Reserve Board. The National Industrial Conference 
Board, a private organization founded in 1916 and supported by 
many business and educational institutions, performs a similar 
function. 
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An example of the possibilities of statistics in economics 
is the achievement of Wesley C. Mitchell (1874-1948), a student 
of Veblen and longtime professor at Columbia University, whose 
services were in frequent demand by the government for almost 
half a century. Mitchell became interested in the business 
cycle, publishing the first edition of his famous book, Business 
Cycles, in 1913. He continued testing the various theories ad­
vanced to explain this phenomenon against a rapidly increasing 
body of statistical data which he assembled and evaluated, much 
of it as research director of the National Burea,u of Economic 
Research, which he helped organize in 1920. In collaboration 
with one of his former students, Mitchell published Measuring 
Business Cycles in 1946. This monumental work was the fruit of 
more than thirty years of careful accumulation of statistical 
data and the painstaking formulation of conclusions. 
Mitchell's conclusions were that the business cycle is an 
integral part of a capitalistic economy. He ruled out the pos­
sibility of any long-run equilibrium by observing _that the econ­
omy is at all times in one or another of the four stages of the 
cycle — prosperity, recession, depression, and recovery — and 
that forces operative in any of the stages tend to bring on the 
one succeeding. This so-called self-generating theory of the 
business cycle has gained wide acceptance among economists. 
The intensive economic research presently under way in this 
country is largely a phenomenon of the period since World War I, 
and represents the efforts of several different groups. First, 
there are many college and university teachers, some of whom 
work through research bureaus that are closely connected with 
educational institutions, while others make use of the increas­
ing number of research grants which are available (a^, for ex­
ample, from the Social Science Research Council). Second, there 
are many economists engaged in research who are employed by 
units of government, business firms, and labor unions. Third, 
other economists are available as consultants on special pro­
jects . 
Among the numerous agencies which have promoted research 
in this field, four may be mentioned for purposes of illustra­
tion. The Twentieth Century Fund (1919), established to conduct 
"research and educational activities in the field of economic 
and social problems" has recently produced studies of American 
agriculture and of pension funds. The National Bureau of Eco­
nomic Research (1920) has recently supported studies in such 
fields as business cycles, national income, economic growth, 
banking, and international economics. The Brookings Institu­
tion (1927), chartered to "engage in research and education in 
the social sciences," has published detailed studies on such 
topics as Controlling Factors in Economic Development (1949), 
The Cost and Financing of SocisTT Security (1950) , and Big Busi­
ness in a~Competitive System (195"¥J~: TEe Ford Foundation has 
given'~$lIJ,000,000 to Resources for the Future, Incorporated, for 
use in promoting reseiaCch in the conservation and use of nat­
ural resources. In addition to the topics already mentioned in 
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this paragraph, economists are interested in such others as 
automation and technological unemployment, the impact of contin­
uing heavy expenditures for defense, the development of under­
developed areas and the effects of that development on other 
parts of the world, and the present rate of increase in the 
world's population. 
No topic in economics in the first half of this century 
was more pervasive than that of the business cycle and economic 
growth, nor has any figure influenced economic theory and pol­
icy more than John Maynard Keynes (1883-1946). Son of an Eng­
lish economist and educator, Keynes was a student of Alfred 
Marshall at Cambridge University, where he studied philosophy 
and mathematics as well as economics. Civil servant, editor, 
teacher, businessman, and prolific writer, he represented the 
British Treasury at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, was a 
director of the Bank of England, and after World War II was 
associated with the International Monetary Fund and the Inter­
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development, two agencies 
established to promote international trade and stability. 
Keynes' greatest work, The General Theory of Employment, 
Interest and Money (1936) , which he thought wouTcE "largely revo­
lutionize o,. the way the world thinks about economic problems," 
was a product of the Great Depression. Seeking for some ex­
planation of this disastrous national and international collapse, 
he concluded that existing economic theory was of no help. He 
was especially critical of its assumption that there was an auto­
matic regulator directing an economy toward an equilibrium which 
would provide a high level of employment for labor and all other 
resources. His comment about the long run on which the classi­
cists seemed to depend so heavily was that in the long run we 
are all dead. The persistence of the depression in some coun­
tries led him to the conclusion that an equilibrium might be 
reached in which a sizeable part of the labor force would be 
permanently unemployed. He saw the possibility of a long-run 
stagnation in a "mature economy" where investment opportunities 
were few and where the volume of savings, provided almost en­
tirely by the wealthy, was high. In such a society, where the 
money taken out of the economy by savings was not returned to it 
in the form of investment, there simply would not be enough pur­
chasing power to buy the goods and services produced. The re­
sult would be chronic depression. 
Claiming that he was acting as a physician to an ailing 
capitalism rather than as its prospective gravedigger, Keynes 
prescribed a program to spur recovery. Government, he wrote, 
must closely control the money supply. It must be prepared to 
"prime the pump," to spend enough money on useful projects in 
times of depression to insure a desired level of employment. 
The corollary of this was to tax enough in times of prosperity 
to prevent overexpansion and inflation, as well as to balance 
the budget, if possible, over the period of one business cycle. 
Keynes believed that, whatever might have been true in the 
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past, capitalism in the twentieth century was a ship without a 
rudder to steer it between the twin perils of depression and 
inflation. Simply put, his solution was to socialize a part of 
capitalism in order to save the rest by having the government 
provide the rudder. Even here, he did not recommend that it act 
alone, but only whenever private efforts were inadequate in 
maintaining employment. In the 1930's Keynes believed that gov­
ernment action would have to be frequent, well-planned, and on 
a wide scale. 
How much Keynes and his writings actually influenced the 
New Deal is still a matter of argument, but his impact on eco­
nomics has often been called the Keynesian Revolution, If his 
book was one of the most influential of the first half of the 
century, it was also one of the most controversial, Keynes had 
many followers, some of whom have already much further devel­
oped and modified the ideas which he propounded and the mathe­
matics which he used to express them. He also had (and still 
has) many severe critics, both fellow economists and others, 
some of whom took issue with the validity of his theories while 
others accused him of being a socialist. 
After a quarter century it is becoming apparent that the 
term "Keynesian Revolution" is too strong. Even for Keynes, 
there was no wholesale destruction of neoclassical theory. 
What he did was to change radically the emphasis in economics 
from value, price, and individuals to the behavior of the whole 
economy during the course of a business cycile. It has been 
claimed that this was a sharper change than occurred in the 
theory of any other social science thus far in this century. 
In so doing, Keynes introduced his own vocabulary to replace 
classical concepts which he regarded as inadequate or irrelevant. 
For example, he did not believe that the classical theory ex­
plained the strongest factors in determining either the supply 
of or the demand for capital funds. On the supply side, he 
argued, the desire to have assets in cash or forms readily con­
vertible into cash (what Keynes called liquidity preference) 
might discourage potential investors, even though the prevailing 
interest rates are high. On the demand side, the return which 
a businessman thinks he will get on a new investment which he is 
considering (what Keynes called the marginal efficiency of cap­
ital) , if it is low, might discourage him from borrowing, even 
though interest rates have fallen far below their customary 
levels. In this way Keynes explained why he believed the inter­
est rate was not the regulator of investment which the classi­
cists held it to be. In its place he put a subjective, psycho­
logical factor — the marginal efficiency of capital — and as­
signed it a position of highest importance in his theory. 
By way of summary, we can say that the work of Keynes and 
others who both preceded and followed him during this century 
has turned the balance of economic thought away frpm what is 
called "microeconomics," with its primary interest in individu­
als and individual firms, in prices, value, and the distribution 
of income to the factors of production. The balance has swung 
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toward "macroeconomics," a term denoting a primary interest in 
the performance of the whole economy. Macroeconomics holds 
that the most meaningful view of the economy is one which 
focuses on total or aggregate income and total or aggregate ex­
penditure of businesses, households, and government, and on 
maintaining that level of savings and investment which will 
provide full employment. This is a view which tries to encom­
pass all of the many interdependent social, political, and psy­
chological factors which bear upon the economy. There is still 
a question as to how accurately total income and expenditure 
can be measured. The empirical tools thus far devised by macro-
economists are at best limited in their usefulness. There is 
also the nagging question whether it is even yet remotely pos­
sible for the best prepared and hardest working economists to 
master the many imponderable factors in an economy which appears 
to be much more dynamic than Keynes believed possible twenty 
years ago. The predictions of the Keynesians regarding postwar 
economies in the United States and elsewhere have been uniformly 
proved to have been too pessimistic. 
Almost wholly rejected now is the classical belief in an 
automatic long-run equilibrium which competition will usher in, 
and the belief that economic depressions are but temporary dis­
locations brought on by unwise government policies. The newer 
view in economics rejects the classical commitment to laissez 
faire in favor of a commitment to government intervention, al­
though just when and how the government should step in is still 
not agreed upon. The purpose of this intervention is not, as 
it was with the New Liberals, primarily to establish economic 
justice, but rather to secure and maintain full employment by 
making up for deficiencies of one sort or another in the private 
sector of the economy. The political implications of taxing, 
borrowing, and spending to support Keynesian objectives cannot 
be overlooked. 
This change of emphasis is now firmly entrenched in most 
economics textbooks used in this country, where Keynes' influ­
ence has been greater than anywhere else. As the urgency of 
the Great Depression fades, even in our memories, .the consensus 
among economists is that the task now is to relate the best in 
Keynesian theory, which has never lost completely the stamp of 
its depression origin, and in neoclassical theory, which has 
experienced something of a revival, to form a useful tool in 
attacking current economic problems. Macroeconomics and micro­
economics no longer appear mutually exclusive of each other, 
but rather, quite the reverse, mutually dependent upon each 
other. 
The change of emphasis is also firmly entrenched in the 
minds of many public officials of both major political parties 
in the United Sta,tes, In 1946 Congress passed what is known as 
the Pull Employment Act, which declared it to be 
the continuing policy and responsibility of the Federal 
Government -to use all practicable means consistent with 
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its needs and obligations and other essential considera­
tions of national policy/.oto coordinate and utilize 
all its plans, functions, and resources for the purpose 
of creating and maintaining..oconditions under which 
there will be afforded useful employment opportunities... 
for those able, willing, and seeking to work, and to 
promote maximum employment, production, and purchasing 
power, 
Admittedly, the language of this act is general enough to per­
mit many interpretations of how seriously it is to be taken and 
how it should be enforced, but the point is that the federal 
government had made a commitment such as this for the first time 
in its history. The Pull Employment Act also created a Council 
of Economic Advisers, responsible to the president. Noted econ­
omists have frequently been appointed to these positions. 
The purpose of the document which follows is to illustrate 
how the performance of our economy is frequently described today 
and what type of data many economists believe is most useful in 
imparting meaning in the study of economics. The reader should 
make a comparison of this approach with that of the classical 
economists described in Chapter XIV. He should also compare it 
with the approaches of other contemporary social sciences. There 
are many details in the selection which need not be mastered in 
gaining a general understanding of this newer approach. The 
selection is taken from National Income, 1954 edition: A Supple­
ment to the Survey of Current Business, prepared by the United 
States Department o7~"Commerce. 
Chronological Review; 1929-53 
The year 1929 marked the end of an era of relatively 
full employment, business confidence, and general prosper­
ity. Economic activity had been advancing strongly, with 
only minor interruptions, for eight years. 
Business decline: 1929-33 
The 1929 downturn, the ultimate causes of which are 
still a matter of controversy, was most clearly reflected 
in the collapse of investment demand. Gross private do­
mestic investment dropped about one-third from 1929 to 
1930, as new construction and producers' purchases of dur­
able equipment were cut sharply and the accumulation of 
nonfarm business inventories ceased. Foreign purchases 
also declined in 1930, although the drop was not reflected 
in net foreign investment because of a matching reduction 
in import demand. 
With employment and incomes adversely affected by the 
sharp reduction of investment, consumer purchases also de­
creased, contributing to the general contraction and in­
ducing still further cuts in outlays for investment. 
Consumer purchases, however, held up much better in 
1930 than investment demand. The aggregate income flow to 
individuals shrank less than production and the incomes 
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generated by it, as undistributed corporate profits ab­
sorbed a disproportionate share of the over-all decrease 
in earned income. Also, consumers tended to spend a 
higher proportion of current income or to dissave in the 
attempt to preserve previous living standards. 
Essentially the same pattern of cumulative decline 
persisted, and in fact accelerated, during 1931 and 1932. 
By the latter year, gross private domestic investment had 
fallen to the very low level of less than $1 billion, as 
contrasted with $16 billion in 1929. The further moderate 
decline of the gross national product in 1933 was in con­
sumer purchases, where it reflected primarily lower aver­
age prices rather than a further decrease in volume. 
Over the entire period of contraction from 1929 to 
1933, the gross national product dropped by nearly one-* 
half, from $104 billion to $56 billion. At the bottom 
of the depression less than 3 percent of the Nation's out­
put went into business investment, as compared with 15^ 
percent in 1929. Conversely, consumer purchases rose from 
three-fourths of the old total in 1929 to five-sixlhs in 1933. 
Government purchases, although little changed in absolute 
dollar volume, were considerably increased in relative 
importance by the collapse of private demand. 
More than half of the 1929-33 decline in the market 
value of the national product stemmed from lower prices. 
As measured by the '^ross national product in constant 
(1947) dollars, real output feil by three-tenths. 
Foremost among the factors underlying the shrinkage 
of real output wft§ the reduction of employment. At the 
depth of the depression, the number of persons engaged in 
production was aimcjst one-fifth iower than in 1929, and 
unemployment was almost 13 million— close to one-fourth 
of the Nation's labor force. Mpreover, average hours 
worked per week by those who remained employed were con­
siderably reduced, 
Recovery: ,1933-3f'^ : 
i Some of the most serious deflationary forces under­
lying the post-1929 pollapse were by 1932 beginning to spend 
themselves. Installations of i^ew plant and equipment had 
virtually ceased in most segments of the economy, and such 
gross fixed business investment as did persist represented 
primarily the fulfillment of minimum replacement needs. 
As replacements hkd'been cut to the bone for several years, 
the feasibility Of further postponing them was rapidly 
diminishing by the end of 1932; Business purchases of 
durable equipment, "accordinglyj fell no lower in 1933, 
Private construction activity did continue downward, but 
the drop was smaller than in any of the three preceding 
years. 
Sizable inventory liquidation continued in 1933, but 
as it had already carried working stocks close to a minimum 
even in relation to the low current volume of sales, the 
rate of liquidation was considerably reduced. It had 
previously been possible for businesses to meet the sagging 
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Volume of sales partly out of relatively excessive exist­
ing inventories, with the consequence that production— 
and hence total income — was reduced even more than con­
solidated business sales» Now, however, this possibility 
was vanishing, and it became necessary to keep output at 
least on a par with current demand. Here too, then, a 
weighty deflationary force was exhausting itself. 
With the marked retardation of income declines stem­
ming directly from reduced investment expenditures, the 
fall in consumer demand was measurably slowed in 1933. 
The stage was thus finally set for recovery. It was evi­
denced in a few industries as early as the fall of 1932, 
but appears to have dated generally from the spring of 
1933. Monthly personal income data show the low point in 
March, after which there was a slow and uneven rise during 
the remainder of the year. 
With its decline arrested in 1933, fixed business in­
vestment turned up moderately in 1934, when both construc­
tion and equipment outlays began to expand again. Nonfarm 
inventory liquidation ceased, and a general trend toward 
rebuilding of stocks depleted during the depression set 
in. It was stimulated not only by the emerging recovery 
of sales, but by the rise in prices already under way 
during 1933. 
In the meantime, the Federal Government had assumed 
an active role in the economy, and was making strenuous ef­
forts to promote recovery. Along with the adoption of 
other measures, it entered the market directly on an ex­
panding scale, especially in its work relief activities, 
and also provided substantial aid to State and local gov­
ernments . 
With the increase of incomes generated by the pick­
up of business investment and the growth of government 
purchases, personal consumption expenditures also rose 
in 1934, Their expansion, in turn, fed the income stream 
and provided stimulus for a further upsurge of investment. 
This was at first mainly confined to long-deferred replace­
ment of capital facilities which had deteriorated during 
the depression; but as profits reappeared and business 
confidence in futui'e prospects was gradually restored, an 
increasing proportion went into wholly new plant and equip­
ment, and inventories were expanded to meet the rising 
volume of sales. Residential building, spurred in part 
by Federal aid to homeowners, moved ahead once more, and 
total gross private domestic investment advanced steadily 
from $1^ billion in 1933 to $11^ billion in 1937. 
Consumer purchases also continued to rise. At $67 
billion in 1B37, they were 45 percent above the low mark of 
1933. Although their rate of increase was proportionately 
smaller than that of domestic capital formation, they rep­
resented quantitatively the largest element in the upward 
spiral of employment, production, and incomes. 
Apart from the newly expanded role of government, the 
whole mechanism of the recovery was thus very similar to 
that of the downswing, except that it operated in reverse 
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and also more slowly. Of the $35 billion increase in 
gross national product from 1933 to 1937, about 30 per­
cent was in private domestic investment, raising it from 
2§ to 13 percent of the total. Consumer outlays accounted 
for about 60 percent of the change — substantially less 
than their share of total output — and government pur­
chases, dropping slightly in relative importance, absorbed 
the remaining 10 percent of the increment. 
The recession of 1938 
Inccnpleteas was the recovery of the economy by 1937, 
it was interrupted by a downturn beginning in the latter 
part of that year and extending through mid-1938. Al­
though of brief duration, this downturn was relatively 
severe. Within a few months, unemployment rose sharply. 
Industrial production fell by over one-fourth from August, 
1937 to January, 1938, and personal income dropped at a 
pace comparable to that prevailing in 1931-32. The de­
cline tapered off thereafter, however, and production be­
gan to pick up again in the second half of 1938. For the 
year as a whole, the decrease in gross national product 
was about 6 percent. 
The 1937-38 recession was much steeper in its initial 
descent than the previous downswing, but it was of a less 
basic character. Of the $5^ billion decline in gross na­
tional product from 1937 to 1938, almost three-fifths was 
attributable to a shift from accumulation to liquidation 
of business inventories. Inventory shifts accounted for 
only 16 percent of the drop in output from 1929 to 1930. 
Business plant and equipment expenditures contracted 
about as sharply in 1938 as in 1930, but residential con­
struction activity, contrastingly, continued to rise, and 
consumption expenditures, despite the drop in employment 
and personal income, declined by only 4 percent, as com­
pared with 10 percent in 1930. The consuming public as a 
whole sustained its spending close to the 1937 rate by a 
$3 billion cut in personal saving. Moreover, the moder­
ate decline in consumer outlays which did occur was very 
largely counterbalanced by increased government buying and 
net foreign investment. 
Altogether, purchases of goods and services by final 
users of the Nation's output declined by less than 3 per­
cent in 1938, as compared with 11 percent in 1930, and the 
major portion of the swing in production was absorbed by 
the change in inventories. Curtailment of production 
ceased as soon, as the strength of final demand became ap­
parent. The drop in fixed business investment proved to 
have been instigated by short-run considerations, rather 
than by any fundamental lack of investment opportunities. 
The basic underlying situation, in fact, was that large 
capital requirements accumulated during the depression 
still remained to be fulfilled, and that many new invest­
ment opportunities stemming from technological advances 
remained to be exploited. 
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Renewed recovery; 1938-41 
Following the jar of the 1938 recession, the recovery 
was renewed and continued steadily into 1941, when it was 
merged with the first stages of military preparation for 
World War II. 
All forms of business investment were expanding stead­
ily during this period. Purchases of producers' durable 
equipment nearly doubled in dollar volume from 1938 to 
1941, and private construction activity also rose strongly. 
Inventory liquidation ceased in 1939, when production was 
brought back in line with current sales, and inventories 
were accumulated on a mounting scale in the next two years. 
By 1941, total gross private domestic investment 
was not far from three times as large as in 1938. For 
the first time, it surpassed the 1929 total, both in value 
and in physical volume. Net foreign investment was also 
sizable in the three years following 1938, being espe­
cially stimulated in 1940 and 1941 by foreign demand for 
munitions and other supplies required for the Allied war 
effort o 
Responding to the increased incomes generated by 
expanding employment — and contributing, in turn, to 
the advance of profits, business investment, employment, 
and incomes — personal consumption expenditures rose from 
$64^ billion in 1938 to $82 billion in 1941. The rela­
tive rise was particularly marked — about two-thirds — 
in outlays for durable goods. Higher prices figured in 
the advancing rate of consumer spending, but the major 
portion represented enlarged quantities of goods and 
services. The real volume of personal consumption per 
capita increased 16 percent from 1938 to 1941, and ex­
ceeded the 1929 figure from 1939 on.».. 
The war economy: 1942-45 
Preparations for war began at a time when the economy 
was operating at less than full capacity, with unemployed 
labor, plant, and equipment, and an abundance of raw mate­
rials. At first, because of the availability of these 
unused economic resources, war production could be superim­
posed upon the civilian economy. It acted as a stimulant, 
and civilian production increased concurrently. Gross 
private domestic investment proceeded at a high rate, and 
consumer purchases — especially of durable goods — were 
buoyant. 
During most of 1941, the needs of the war program were 
thus compatible with expanding civilian production. More­
over, much of the capital equipment acquired during this 
period later proved to be readily convertible to war pro­
duction, Also, the additions to the stock of capital, 
along with additions to the stock of durable consumer 
goods, subsequently permitted the diversion of more pro­
ductive resources from civilian use than would otherwise 
have been possible except with sharper cuts in living 
standards, 
As the dimensions of the war effort expanded, however, 
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se];;ious problems emerged. Although the rising volume of 
w^r production generated a rapid expan'^ion of incomes, it 
provide^ no {goods and services to satisfy the resultant 
growth of civilian demand. Instead, it Impinged upon 
their ayailabillty as soon as the'slack in the economy had 
laeen taken up. Shortages of specific labor skills, cap­
ital facilities, and raw materials began to be more and 
more frequpntlj^ encountered. Pearl Harbor, it be­
came obvious that the war program would take proportions 
of output 8o huge that they could not be provided by en­
larged productloA alone, and that civilian demand would have to be restricted. 
Durl&g the period of transition to a full war economy, 
accordingly, a svlccesslon of measures was adopted with a ^ 
view to ensuring maximum war production together with the 
optlmiun functlonlnfK of civilian ece^nomy. Rates of 
taxation were steeply Increased, hot ohly to help finance 
Government war expdnidltures, but ;also td restrict the 
•mount of Civilian i^'iirchaslng p^er available to bid for 
the limited volume of goods and services remaining after 
military requirements had been met. Fiscal measures were 
supplemented by the Imposition of direct controls, includ­
ing priorities, Inventory limitation orders, allocations,' 
manpower regulations, price and wage controls, and ration­
ing. In addition, Individuals were urged to restrict con­
sumption voluntarily and to Invest their surplus purchasing power In Government bonds. 
On the whole, the flexibility of the economy In the 
traastltlon to full-scale war production proved great and 
total production continued to rise rapidly despite conver­sion. ••»•••• 
Reconversion and postwar boom: 1945-48 
At the end of World War IZ, the Nation faced a set of 
economi<^/fpvoblems which In some ways were the counterpart 
to those of the original mobilization. It was widely re­
cognised that the transition from a situation In which 
roughly two-fifths of economic resources were being em­
ployed In war production to one In which most of the re­
sources would again be devoted to civilian output could 
only be accomplished in an orderly fashion by widespread 
cooperation among all major groups in the economy. As in 
the mobilisation itself, the striking flexibility of the 
economy was demonstrated. 
A broad Government program designed to speed recon­
version, and to ease its impact upon the returning soldier 
and upon business, was enacted. With the quick resurgence 
of business, personal, and foreign demands, as well as the 
vast Government programs undertaken to aid in the rehabil­
itation of war devastated areas, the immediate postwar 
economic decline was held to moderate proportions.' 
Although war purchases of the Federal Government 
were cut back with great speed -- from an annual rate of 
$90 billion in the second quarter of 1945 to $28 billion in 
the first quarter of 1946 — much of the slack was quickly 
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taken up by the rapid expansion of private spending. 
Total gross national product dropped 12 percent over 
these three quarters, or by $27 billion at annual rates; 
thus more than half*of the drop in war expenditures was 
offset. Discharged servicemen and war plant workers were 
speedily absorbed in civilian pursuits, and at no time 
did unemployment rise appreciably above 2^ million. 
After the first quarter of 1946, the buoyancy of pri­
vate demand more than offset theS moderate further declines 
in government purchases. Strohg inflationary pressures 
characterized the 1945-46 reconversion, even before con­
trols were eliminated, and continued to dominate the eco­
nomic scene for the next two years,... 
Several key factors underlay the strength of private 
demand. During the war, both consumers and businesses had 
accumulated an enormous volume of savings — much of it 
in liquid form. At the same time, they had built up a 
backlog of urgent demands for all types of civilian goods, 
and especially for durables. 
As regards the purchasing power of consumers, it may 
be further noted thkt in the brief contraction from mid-
1945 to early 1946 the flow of disposable personal income 
was maintained. Uridistributed corporate earnings absorbed 
a large share of the swing in total income arising from 
production, and the Government disbursed mustering-out 
payments and other veterans' benefits in large volume and 
lowered the wartime tax rates. Not only did the pent-up 
demand for durable consumer goods materialize as expected, 
but an insistent consumer demand for nondurables and 
services also became an active and powerful force in the 
economy, 
At the same time, business plar(t an^ equipment invest 
ment programs were pushed ahead fast in the immediate 
reconversion period and continued to expand strongly there 
after. Inventories, very low at the close of the war, had 
to be accumulated rapidly to bring working stocks into 
line with the heavy volume of business. The pace of resi­
dential building activity also accelerated steadily. 
Moreover, net foreign investment assumed a relative 
importance far beyond its usual role. With financial sup­
port provided both by wartime accumulations of gold and 
dollar balances and by a large volume of United States 
Government loans, aiid under the stimulus of world-wide 
shortages stemming from the impairment of productive facil 
ities abroad, net foreign purchases of American output 
reached unprecedented proportions. 
In combination, these heavy demands placed a severe 
strain upon the productive capacity of the economy, which 
was reduced considerably below the wartime peak. Despite 
low unemployment, the number of persons engaged in produc­
tion was 7 million, or 11 percent, lower in 1946 than in 
1944, This was due to the withdrawal from the labor force 
of sizable classes of individuals — such as adolescents, 
housewives, and persons past the normal retirement age — 
who are not ordinarily employed, but who had been induced 
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by special wartime circumstances to accept employment. 
In addition, average hours worked per week fell off as 
overtime schedules were abandoned, and there appears to 
have been some loss during the reconversion period in 
real output per man-hour worked in private industries. 
With the physical volume of production thus pressing 
against capacity, much, if not most, of the pressure ex­
erted by intensive consumer, business, and foreign buying 
was reflected in price movements. Prices were already 
advancing, though often in covert fashion, in the early 
reconversion period. After the termination of wartime 
controls in the latter half of 1946, they spurted up very 
sharply, and, except for a brief interlude of hesitation 
in the spring of 1947, serious inflationary tendencies 
accompanied the postwar boom until 1948. 
In that year a better balance between supply and de­
mand emerged, and the price rise tapered off. This was 
brought about partly through an appreciable expansion of 
real output and partly through a diminution in the inten­
sity of some of the demands, including those from abroad, 
from which the greatest pressures had emanated. 
There was a break in agricultural prices early in 
1948, Although these recovered briefly, their downward 
slide, influenced by the prospect of excellent domestic 
harvests and an improved crop situation abroad, was resumed 
after midyear. Agricultural prices are a substantial element 
in the total price picture, and their decline was an impor­
tant factor shaping the course of economic developments 
during 1948. 
More notable, however, was the increasing stability 
in consumer markets. The upsurge in personal consumption 
expenditures, stimulated by backlog demands and reinforced 
by large holdings of liquid assets and a low volume of 
consumer debt outstanding, had constituted one of the main 
foundations of the boom. As the more urgent demands were 
satisfied, and as the abnormally high spending rate of 
1947 made inroads into the net liquid asset positions of 
many consumers, the rising trend of consumption flattened 
out in the latter part of 1948.... 
Business readjustment and recovery; 1949-50 
Businessmen adopted more cautious buying policies toward 
the end of 1948, and the large inventory accumulations of 
that year were sharply reduced in the first quarter of 1949. 
Substantial inventory liquidation emerged in the next quar­
ter, and the drain upon stocks persisted during the re­
mainder of the year. The shift in the inventory position 
was reflected in a curtailment of production mainly in the 
manufacturing industries, where the bulk of all inventories 
held in the economy is produced. 
By contrast, total final purchases — that is, elements 
of the gross national product other than the change in in­
ventories — held up extremely well during 1949. Consumer 
spending in the first quarter dropped but slightly below 
its dollar volume at the crest of the postwar boom, then 
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climbed slowly upward again during the remainder of the 
year. Residential building activity decreased from a 
peak in the second quarter of 1948 but picked up again in 
the spring and advanced strongly thereafter. And govern­
ment purchases, chiefly because of the expanding Federal 
foreign aid and farm price support programs, more than 
offset the moderate declines which occurred in business 
outlays for plant and equipment. For the year as a whole, 
total final purchases actually exceeded those of 1948. 
That the curtailment of employment and payrolls in 
the manufacturing sector had no greater impact upon consump­
tion expenditures in 1949 was attributable in part to the 
payment of sizable unemployment compensation benefits, and 
also in some degree to the cushioning effects upon dis­
posable personal income of lower Federal income taxes as 
a result of the previous year's Revenue Act. It may also 
be noted that dividends were sustained, notwithstanding 
the sharp fall in profits. Perhaps more important than 
any of these factors, however, was the apparent willing­
ness of the consuming public as a whole to spend increas­
ing proportions of current income to maintain living 
standards during the recession. 
It became apparent in the second half of 1949 that 
the curtailment of output had been excessive in relation to 
the existing stable volume of business sales. Accordingly, 
production was stepped back up, and the accumulation of 
inventories was resumed. Meanwhile, the recovery of resi­
dential construction had grown into a sustained building 
boom, and consumer demand, already strong, was being bol­
stered by large Government payments to veterans. These 
factors, moreover, were being reinforced by a renewed 
upturn in fixed business investment. 
This widening resurgence of production generated in­
creases in employment and incomes, adding further impetus 
to consumer purchasing. Before mid-1950, a business up­
swing of substantial dimensions was under way and was 
carrying the economy close to full-capacity operation, 
Korean war period 
It was upon this expansionary situation that the 
urgent demands resulting directly and indirectly from the 
outbreak of hostilities in Korea were superimposed, as 
the Nation decided upon a defense program encompassing a 
sharp step-up in direct military potential as well as the 
establishment of a broad base of productive facilities to 
permit quick economic mobilization in case of full-scale 
war. 
The ensuing rise in national output continued without 
interruption for three years, until the second quarter of 
1953, when gross national product reached a peak of $370 
billion at seasonally adjusted annual rates, one third 
above the rate of $276 billion in the second quarter of 
1950. About half of this rise represented expansion in 
physical volume while the remainder reflected the sharp 
advance in prices which occurred in large part during the 
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first nine months of the period.... 
While the defense buildup was the dominant factor in 
the economic situation throughout the three years follow­
ing mid-1950, its character and impact varied considerably 
during this period. 
In the initial stage the increase in national security 
expenditures was heavily concentrated in military payrolls, 
food, clothing, and other related outlays which were capa­
ble of rapid expansion in a comparatively short time. The 
strength of the Armed Forces increased by 1-3/4 million 
persons in the first year of the defense effort — about 
four-fifths of the ultimate total increase — and national 
security outlays mounted from 6 percent to 11 percent of 
the gros^ national product, 
At the same time there was a strong advance in invest­
ment by businesses that were participating in the growing 
volume of defense orders. This included investment in in­
ventories and in plant and equipment, the latter receiv­
ing a special stimulus from the rapid amortization pro­
visions that had been granted for emergency facilities. 
Although the demands stemming directly from the de­
fense program contributed to expansionary developments, 
it was the waves of anticipatory buying, set in motion by 
the expectation of commodity shortages and price increases, 
that determined the tone of the business situation in this 
period. Consumer buying spurted in the third quarter of 
1950 and again in the first quarter of 1951, following the 
further extension of the Korean conflict. Responding to 
sharply rising sales, as well as to the same expectations 
that motivated consumers, businessmen added greatly to 
their inventories, and fixed investment not related to the 
defense program was also stimulated. 
Although production continued to rise briskly, demand 
outstripped the supply of goods, and prices bounded upward. 
By mid-1951 the situation had changed significantly. 
Output was expanding at a rapid rate, and it became appar­
ent that the productive capacity of the economy had been 
underestimated. Taxes had been raised, and the establish­
ment of price and wage controls gave some assurance to the 
public that inflation would be kept in check. Other meas­
ures, including controls on credit and on the flow of stra­
tegic materials, had been introduced to ensure that the 
necessary resources would be channeled in an orderly fashion 
into the defense program. 
As a consequence of these developments, and the well-
stocked position of consumers after several months of ex­
traordinarily heavy buying, spending propensities eased 
markedly during 1951, The rate of consumer spending out 
of disposable income, which had risen to 96 percent during 
the buying surge in the first quarter fell to about 91 per­
cent in the succeeding quarters of the year,.., 
In the third year of the defense effort — from mid-1952 
to mid-1953 — the Nation's capacity to produce continued 
to expand substantially while the rate of growth of national 
security outlays tapered off. This shift in the relation 
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of supply and demand permitted the relaxation and subse­
quent removal of economic controls, 
Civilian demand proved strong, particularly in the 
durable goods lines previously restricted by controls and 
material shortages. Residential, institutional, and 
State and local construction, business investment in 
plant and equipment other than in defense-connected in­
dustries , and consumer and inventory demand for automo­
biles and other durable goods became major factors supporting 
further economic growth. Together with the still rising 
military demand they provided the basis for a balanced 
economic expansion which, unlike that of the previous 
year, was shared by most industries. 
Agriculture was the principal sector of the economy 
that ran counter to the generally favorable trend. As a 
consequence of lower farm prices, income originating in 
agriculture was redttced substantially during 1952 and 
1953. The steady downward pressure on prices reflected 
the unusually heavy output of farm products — which 
reached successive highs in the 2 years — and the ap­
preciable decline in foreign sales. Domestic consumption 
remained firm, however, and the full force of the other 
developments was not reflected in farm income, as large 
quantities of the chief crops and dairy products were 
placed under loan to the Commodity Credit Corporation, 
both in 1952 and 1953, 
The restoration of civilian durable goods production 
was retarded by the steel strike which occurred in the 
second quarter of 1952 and affected end products mainly 
in the third. As a consequence final purchases and inven­
tory accumulation of durables were particularly heavy in 
the fourth quartet of 1952 and were probably raised also 
in the opening half of 1953, 
Total production reached a peak in the second quarter 
of 1953 and receded moderately in the latter half of the 
year. The major change occurred in the net flow of goods 
into the inventories of durable goods industries. These 
inventories had been replenished and the immediate need 
for further accumulation had thus been removed. In addi­
tion, sizable liquidations were made when it became appar­
ent that, relative to actual and prospective demand, some 
of the earlier build-up had been excessive. 
National security expenditures, entering a new phase, 
registered moderate declines, mainly in the procurement 
of hard goods, and consumer purchases of commodities, par­
ticularly durables5 also drifted downward. The effect of 
these reductions on total final purchases was offset, how­
ever, by advances in other conponents of national expend­
itures, notably consumer expenditures for services. State 
and local government purchases, and the agricultural price 
support outlays of the Federal Government. Hence final 
purchases were maintained in the aggregate in the latter 
half of 1953, 
While the percentage decline in total national output 
was small, it was heavily concentrated in durable goods 
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and thus had a disproportionate impact upon the durable 
goods manufacturing industries where it led to substantial 
reductions in production, employment, wages, and profits. 
The year 1954 opened with these developments still in 
progress. * 
